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IN THE SUPP£ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROCHELLE RITCHIE WILSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
ROBERT GAINES NILSON, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEI1ENT OF THE CASE 
A. Uature of the Case. 
Case no. 15277 
This is an appeal from that portion of the Decree 
of Divorce entered in the court below that ordered the dis-
tribution of the marital estate property and the payment 
of alimony to Plaintiff-Respondent. Defendant-Appellant, 
a doctor of medicine, claims on appeal that the trial court 
was in error in not awarding him a bigger piece of the marital 
estate pie and in requiring him to pay alimony to ~rs. Wilson, 
the Plaintiff, in the sum of $900.00 a month. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Because of the complexity and size of the marital 
estate here in question, this case required the better part 
o~ three days of trial, almost all of which was devoted to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the presentation of evidence and testimony regarding the 
nature, extent and distribution of the marital estate. On 
February 4, 1977, midway through the trial, the court entered 
its Partial Decree of Divorce (R. 76) '"herein /1rs. ~hlson, 
Respondent, was granted a divorce against Appellant on the 
grounds that Dr. Wilson had announced to her on occasion that 
he did not love her, that he had fallen in love with another 
woman (his best friend's wife) whom he wanted to marry, and, 
although Respondent pleaded for an opportunity to attempt 
to salvage the marriage, Appellant would not be dissuaded 
from pursuing his announced course of action (Green TR. 70, 
11. 12-30; 71' 11. 1-11). 
After taking additional testimony and evidence with 
respect to the nature, extent and proposed distribution of t~e 
marital estate, the court entered its final Decree of Divorce 
as to Property Distribution on Xay 6, 1977 (R. 129), •.1herein 
property •.vas distributed and alimony al<arded as hereinafter 
described. 
C. Relief Sought on Appeal. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affir~ed 
and ~espondent should be awarded a reasonable attorney's ~ee 
incurred in defending this appeal. 
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D. Statement of Facts. 
The parties to this action met and married at the 
outset of Dr. Nilson's medical career on August 27, 1969. 
Although both had children from a previous marriage, no 
issue was born to this union. When Respondent married Dr. 
Wilson, she was 33 years of age (Red TR. 43); at the time 
the final decree was entered, she was 41. 
Notwithstanding Appellant's description of money 
and property contributed by each at the outset of their 
marriage (Brief of Appellant, 3), Respondent's net worth 
contribution exceeded that of Dr. Wilson; in fact his contri-
bution was of a negative nature. 
Although Appellant is careful to enumerate in 
his brief the value of his assets at the outset of this 
marriage, he conveniently omits to mention the extent of 
his concurrent debts and obligations as well. Dr. Wilson 
testified that he contributed the following assets to this 
marriage: an automobile valued at approximately 53,500.00 
(Green TR. 28), a down payment on a house in the sum of 
SlO, 000.00 (Green TR. 28, 11. 10-18) (note that following 
the trial Appellant submitted a statement indicating that 
SlS,OOO.OO had been paid rather than $10,000.00) and office 
equipment valued at $2, OOIJ. 00 (Green TR. 48). 'lo mention 
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is made, however, that he owed the estate of his father S20,aoc.: 
for an obligation incurred prior to this marriage, and, in 
fact, after the filing of the complaint and during the pendency 
of this action he withdrew money from the joint account of 
these parties and liquidated that obligation (Green TR. 58, 
11. 11-30; 59, 11. 1-17; Red TR. 42, 11. 7-12). On another 
occasion during the pendency of this action as well, Appellant 
paid $5,000.00 to an education trust set up for the benefit 
of his sons from his prior marriage, which payment constituted 
a contribution to a continuing obligation which he brought 
with him to this marriage (Green TR. 65, 11. 5-26). 
Furthermore, Appellant brought to this marriage an 
obligation to pay $500.00 per month in child support for the 
maintenance of his two sons. He was obligated to purchase and 
maintain life and health insurance for their benefit, in 
addition to having to provide funds for all education that 
either son might desire or need beyond ~igh school, includina 
graduate and professional schools. 
Although Respondent came to this marriage with 
no areat storehouse of riches, she at least entered it debt-
free. vfuereas Appellant entered the marriage with an 
obligation to pay child support, ~espondent entered the 
marriage with the right to receive child support. N~ereas 
Appellant entered the marriage ~ith deb~s and obliaations ir 
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excess of the value of his assets, Respondent entered the 
marriage with no debts and obligations and assets of practical 
use and value including a washer, a dryer, a sewing machine, 
silver and other household items such as pots, pans and dishes. 
During the course of this marriage, Dr. Wilson pursued 
his medical career while Mrs. Wilson attended to her household 
chores at horne. Over the years of this marriage, his practice 
developed and generated income growth of a rapid and substantial 
nature. His income for the year of 1969 was $24,129.95 (Red 
TR. 11. 6-10; P. Ex. #1); presently his salary is, exclusive 
of income from other business interests and investments, in 
excess of $100,000.00 annually (Brief of Appellant, 17). 
At the time of their marriage, these people understood 
and assumed certain obligations with respect to the children 
of each from their prior marriages. Dr. Wilson, for example 
understood that inasmuch as Respondent had custody of her two 
children, they would reside with her. He assumed the obli-
gation of contributing to their support as well as that of 
~espondent. Mrs. Wilson, on the other hand, understood 
that, although Appellant's former wife had custody of his 
two children, they, as well as other family members, would 
stay with them from time to time. In addition to attending 
~o her normal wifely chores and obligations of cooking, cleaning, 
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shopping, etc., she accommodated Appellant's family members on 
many occasions. His sons stayed with them for one month in the 
summertime of each year, during which time she not only 
assisted in taking care of them, but accompanied them, with 
their father, on camping trips and other vacation excursions 
(Green TR. 17, 11. 2-9). During five of the approximate seven 
years of their marriage, Dr. Wilson's father stayed with 
them for one month at a stretch. His mother and brother were 
also accustomed to staying with them. In each instance, 
Respondent assisted in making their stay comfortable and 
pleasant (Green TR. 17, 11. 14-21). 
In his statement of facts (Brief of Appellant, 4), 
Appellant paints a picture of a husband who tirelessly slaved 
away at work while his wife loafed in the fruits of his labors. 
He states: "During the course of their marriage, Defendant 
worked unceasingly. Through his diligent efforts, he was 
able to accumulate the property which forms part o~ the 
subject matter of this appeal." Ibid. On the other hand, 
he describes Respondent as one who ''never worked during the 
marriage despite the fact that Defendant had encouraged her 
to do so on numerous occasions. *** Plaintiff contributed 
absolutely nothing of a monetary nature to the accrual of 
the estate of Plaintiff and 8efendant." Id. 3,4. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 7 -
~his description of the circumstances of this narri-
age as well as the expectations that each party had 
for the other is unfair and inaccurate insofar as it implies 
that Respondent idled away her time and failed to meet an 
existent need to assist in generating income for their 
support. The record is clear that the financial position 
of these parties from the outset of their marriage was such 
as to never reasonably require a second income in order to 
financially stay afloat. Appellant's own testimony as quoted 
from his Brief (Brief of Appellant, 4) is indicative of the 
fact that any recommendation or conversation he may have had 
with 11rs. Wilson with respect to her finding employment was 
for the sole purpose of providing her a diversion from her 
household chores. He stated, for example, "She did not have 
enough to occupy her time." Ibid. Additional income would 
certainly have only added to his tax burden. 
Absent the need to provide additional income, 11hich 
potentially on the part of Plaintiff would have been miniscule 
in comparison with the income generated by Dr. Nilson, 
~espondent elected to attend to her household chores and apply 
her time in endeavors other than pursuing a gainful avocation. 
~o have retrained herself in her field of training as an x-ray 
technician, as ~ppellant allegedly recommended, 1vould have 
~equired her to co~pletely dedicate herself to total retraining 
inas~uch as some 20 years had passed since she was involved in 
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that rapidly changing area of expertise. (Red TR. 48 11. 26-29). 
The heavy commitment required by such an undertaking on the 
part of Plaintiff was simply greater than the need and interest 
at the time. 
Nith respect to the property distribution and award 
of alimony made by the trial court, it should be noted that the 
decision was not rendered until after the trial judge took 
the matter under advisement for careful consideration follow-
ing three days of trial, the greatest portion of which was 
dedicated to the facts relating to the extent, nature and 
distribution of the marital estate and those issues regarding 
alimony. The third and final day of trial was February 11, 
1977. The court made its minute entry lvith respect to property 
distribution and alimony on April 19, 1977 (R. 125), and 
the appropriate Decree of Divorce as to Property Distribution 
was signed and entered on r1ay 6, 1977, •,;herein the court al•iarded 
alimony to the Respondent in the monthly sum of $900.00, which 
is less than 11 per cent of Defendant's mont~ly income, and 
ordered that the marital estate be distributed as her~i~-
after set forth. Respondent was awarded property valued at 
$90,744.00, whereas Appellant was awarded prooerty valued 
at S206,801.65 or S232,801.65, dependinq upon whether one 
includes the S26,000.00 withdra~m by the doctor- for '1::.:: c·m 
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personal needs from the parties' joint account during the pen-
dency of the action. Appellant is of the opinion that payment 
of said S26,000.00 with $20,000.00 to Defendant's brother and 
the S6,000.00 to the educational trust was made pursuant to 
his legitimate debts and obligations and that, consequently, 
it should not be considered as a part of the marital estate 
but should be offset against the value of his assets he brought 
into this marriage. 
The valuation of the property distribution which 
follows differs from that described in Appellant's Brief 
(Brief of Appellant, 6-9). The discrepancy is a function 
of several omissions and errors made by Defendant in cal-
culating the value of property awarded to each party. Although, 
for example, Appellant announces that he used and accepted 
Pespondent's valuations in preparing his statement, in 
several instances this is simply not the case. I~ each 
instance wherein there is a discrepancy of this nature, 
appropriate references are made in this brief to the trial 
record to verify the same. Furthermore, Appellant counted 
one item twice (the stoneware) in his schedule of property 
a•,arded to Respondent and omitted to mention tHo items of 
property awarded to himself valuing in excess of $16,500.00 
(cold and silver coin collection and 1976 Toyota Land Cruiser). 
~ith that explanation, consider the specifics of the property 
~istri~ution ordered by the trial court in this ~atter. 
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PROPERTY JIJ,IARDED TO PLAINTIFF 
Item 
A. Condominium 
(Plaintiff's 
residence) 
B. Unimproved lots 
in North Carolina 
C. Plaintiff's 
automobile 
Value 
$78,000.00 
12,000.00 
6,200.00 
D. Diamond ring 4,200.00 
E. Furniture in 6,544.00 1 
condominium with 
the exception of those 
items specifically 
awarded to Defendant 
F. Stoneware 
G. Men's chest and 
corner table 
H. Cash 
!. Personal items 
(including jewelry) 
1calculated as follows: 
included in "E" 
above 
included in "E" 
above 
2,000.00 
no value 
$90,744.00 
A. Total value of personal property in 
Comments 
Red TR. 36, 11. ll-18; 
P. F:x. 1!15 
Green TR. 18, 11. 1-6 
Red TR. 71, 11. 23-23; 
P. Ex. #13 
Appellant counted 
this item twice 
Brief of Appellant, 
6' 7 
condomium as per Plaintiff (P. Ex. 113) S 3,316.00 
2. Less household goods awarded Appellant 
and included in cn~putation of A 
(flatware - $62.00; goblets - $50.00; 
elates - SlS.OO; fishtrap ~ables - $20.00; 
stool - SlS.OO; chairs - $300.00; etagere -
S3JO.OO; lamp- S~O.GO; t;ooi:case- $1,000.00) (1,772.00) 
s 6,544.00 
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PROPERTY AWARDED TO DEFENDAclT 
Item Value 
A. Interest in profit- $100,000.00 
sharing trust 
B. Partnership 30,000.00 
interest 
c. Interest in 15,636.73 
professional 
corporation 
D. Cattle 6,200.00 
E. Rocks and equipment 10,635.00 
F. Ranch 10,000.00 
,.. Cottomvood Club 1,500.00 u. 
membership 
ll. Gold and silver coins lCl, 000.00 
:-'oun t3.in lot 
ColT\J!lents 
'C'his value was computed 
by Appellant's own attor-
ney retained to manage 
said trust. Red TR. 
29' ll. 25-28. 
Computed by Appellant's 
own accountant 
Although this includes 
Appellant's Mercedez-
Benz automobile, it does 
not include his 1976 
'C'oyota Land Cruiser 
Base replacement cost. 
Red TR. 76, 11. 16-13; 
Appellant claims that 
its cash value if sold is 
$1,000.00 because of the 
$400.00 transfer fee --
inasmuch as Appellant 
does not intend to sell 
it, however, its value 
to him is what he would 
have to pay to replace 
it, e.g. $1,500 - $2,000. 
n. 83; P. Ex. 415; 
Appellant omitted to 
include this in his 
computation (Brief of 
Appellant 7-8.) 
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J. House trailer 
K. Sheep horns 
L. Fish trap tables 
M. Bronze goblets, 
plates and flat>vare 
:1. :1oney in bank 
0. Appellant's 
automobile 
(1976 Toyota Land 
Cruiser) 
P. Suede chairs 
Q. Etagere 
:1.. Bookcases 
s. Filing drawer, desk, 
naugahyde stool and 
lamp 
- 12 -
700.00 
No value 
150.00 
300.00 
2,531.91 
6,500.00 
800.00 
450.00 
2,000.00 
T. 1976 tax refund less 9,399.00 
S2,000.00 to Respondent 
E'ersonal items :Jo value 
$20G, 801.65 
Appellant's own 
estimate. D. Ex. #32 
Appellant's own 
estimate 
At time this action 
was filed, the amount 
was $28,531.92 -- during 
the pendency of this 
action Appellant with-
drew $26,000.00 --
$20,000.00 of which went 
to App6lant's brother; 
remainder of $6,000.00 
was placed in trust 
for his children by 
former marriage. 
Green TR. 62, 11. 27-29; 
Appellant omitted to 
include this item in 
his computation (Brief 
of Appellant, 7-8) 
D. Ex. 1!32 
D. Ex. !!32 
D. Ex. !' 3 2 
Included in corporate 
assets of 515,636.73. 
". 8 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 13 -
:Jo statement of facts in an appeal of this nature 
would be complete without mention of the parties' respective 
prospects for the future. Appellant ">ill continue to enjoy 
the benefits, income and comforts ge~,r~ted by the practice 
which was built during the course of t~is marriage. His 
annual income which is now in excess of $100,000.00 increased 
over the last seven years some 400 per cent, and there is 
no reason to believe that its potential for the future is 
not equally promising. He was also awarded other income-
producing assets which have the potential of substantially 
supplementing his professional salary. ~ot only does he 
have the security of substantial income at present, but the 
court provided him with the means for complete security at 
the time of his retirement or in the event of disability by 
awarding him his interest in a professional pension currently 
valued at $100,000.00 which was created and contributed to 
during the course of this marriage. 
Dr. Wilson continues to pursue the same career and 
do the same work which he did prior to his separation and 
divorce from ~rs. Wilson. He is a highly trained individual 
who can continue his present lifestyle without any sicrnificant 
adjustf:1.ent. Indeed, this divorce seerr.s to r.a V>" ~ · •i ':e: his 
needs "ery well, inasmuch as he has promptly ~~rried ~~e ~oman 
~or who~ he was willing to sacrifice his ~arriaae with 
"'.esr.:JOndent. 
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Respondent's prospects, on the other hand, present 
a completely different set of circumstances. Whereas this 
divorce has hardly given Dr. Wilson cause to miss a step in 
his present lifestyle, Respondent must now carve out an entirely 
new way of life. Unlike Dr. Wilson, she is not presently 
trained for immediate employment in any field; in fact, 20 years 
have passed since she last found involvement in her field 
of training, which by nature is subject to rapid and dynamic 
advances and changes. lfuereas Appellant was awarded assets 
of an income-producing nature, no such asset was awarded 
to Respondent, leaving her to her own ingenuity to get along 
in life henceforth. lfuereas Dr. Nilson has security for retire-
ment and/or disability, no such security was built in to 
l·trs. Nilson's award of property. In short, she not only has 
lost the happiness and security of her marriage an~ husband 
to their closest friend's wife, but now faces a total 
adjustment to life in order to adequately support herself 
and her children. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE 
EVIDENCE &~D SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT TO 
CORRECT ANY MANIFEST INEQUITIES RESULTING 
FROM THE DECISION BELOW, THE TRIAL JUDGE 
IN A DOMESTIC MATTER HAS CONSIDERABLE 
LATITUDE OF DISCRETION IN ADJUSTING THE 
FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY INTERESTS OF THE 
PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT. HIS ACTIONS ARE 
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT AND VALID AND MAY 
NOT BE UPSET OR MODIFIED ON APPEAL UNLESS 
THE RECORD CLEARLY DISCLOSES Ta~T THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECREE WAS SO PLAINLY ARBI-
TRARY AS TO SHOW A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
WHICH WORKS A MA.~IFEST INJUSTICE OR INEQUITY. 
While it is true that in a divorce action, or in 
any other equitable action for that matter, the Supreme Court 
may review the evidence, make findings and substitute its 
judgment for that entered below, such action of superseding 
the considered decision of the trial judge, who is in the 
best position to arrive at a just and equitable result, 
is rather drastic in nature and should not be lightly under-
taken. In divorce actions, as well as in any other kind of 
appeal, the decision of the lower court is endowed with a 
presumption of validity and correctness, and the Appellant 
shoulders the heavy burden of overcoming that presumption. 
The wide breadth of discretion, which it is 
the trial judge's prerogative and responsibility to exercise, 
is absolutely necessary in a di'Jorce action for tHo reasons. 
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First, there is no fixed formula that can be applied in any 
two cases which will produce a just and equitable result 
in both instances. The number of facts, and their respective 
degrees of importance, that come into play differ substan-
tially from case to case. Each case must turn on its own facts. 
It follows that the second reason for indulging the 
trial court with its considerable latitude of discretion 
is that no one is in a better position that the trial jucge 
to evaluate the credibility of evidence and testimony, to 
weigh the variables involved in each case, and to arrive at 
a decision that will approximate fairness and justice as 
closely as can be accomplished in these kinds of cases. 
Lawlor v. Lawlor, 121 Ut. 201, 240 P.2d 271 (1952). 
Because there is no fixed formula or anything more 
definite than general guidelines, and because the trial judge 
is in the best position to fairly allocate financia~ and 
property interests in a civorce action, his judgment should not 
be upset or modified for the reason that those sitting on the 
Supreme Court may have decided to cut up the pie in different 
proportions. Otherwise, the trial judge would, in fact, have 
little or no discretion in such matters. ~his court stated 
not so many years ago: 
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Even though our constitutional provisions, 
Section 9 of Article VIII, states that 
in equity cases this court may review the 
facts, vle nevertheless take into account 
the advantaged position of the trial judge. 
Accordingly, we recognize that it is his 
prerogative to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses, and in case of conflict, we 
assume that the trial court believed the 
evidence which supports the findings. We 
review the whole evidence in the light 
most favorable to them; and we will not 
disturb them merely because this court 
m~ght have VLewed the matter dLfferently 
but only if the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against the findings. 
For similar reasons, the trial court is 
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion in determining what order should 
be made in such matters; and we will not 
upset his judgment and substitute our own 
unless it clearly appears that the trial 
court abused its discretion or misapplied 
the law. [Citations omitted.] Stone v. 
Stone, 19 Ut.2d 378, 431 P.2d 802 (1967) 
(Emphasis added) . 
The following are a few examples of innumerable cases 
supporting the principles just stated: Naylor v. ~aylor, 
563 P.2d 184 (Ut. 1977) (in matters of divorce the trial judge 
has considerable latitude of discretion in the disposition of 
property. His judgment should not be disturbed unless it 
works a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a ~ 
abuse of discretion); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Ut. 1975) 
(trial court has considerable latitude -- burden on appellant 
~o show misunderstanding or nisapplication of law resulting in 
substantial or prejudicial error or that the evidence must 
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clearly preponderate against the findings or that serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest clear abuse of discretion); 
Mitchell v. Hitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Ut. 1974) (the trial judge ' 
has considerable latitude of discretion); Nhitehead v. Whitehead,: 
16 Ut.2d 179, 397 P.2d 987 (1965) (trial judge must be allowed 
wide latitude of discretion in matters relating to alimony --
his decision should not be changed unless evidence shows manifes: 
inequity and injustice). 
This standard of review on appeal in a divorce action 
has found expression in many different forms. This court has 
stated in numerous decisions that it 
... will not substitute its judgment in a 
divorce proceeding relative to alimony and 
division of property for that of the trial 
court unless the record clearly discloses 
that the trial court's decree in such matters 
is plainly arbitrary. Allen v. Allen, 109 
Ut. 99, 165 P.2d 872 (1946) (Emphasis added.); 
see also Noolley v. Woolley, 113 Ut. 391, 
195 P.2d 743 (1948). 
On other occasions, the court has stated that it 
will not upset or modify the decision of the trial court in 
a divorce action unless the appellant proves that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings and decree, that 
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of law resultina 
in substantial prejudicial error, or that serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (1977); Harding v. Harding, 
26 !Jt. 2d 277' 488 p. 2d 308 (19 71). 
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The most commonly used term in characterizing this 
standard of review is "plain" or "clear abuse of discretion". 
"Abuse of discretion" has been defined by the Court of Appeals 
of the District of Columbia as meaning "action which is arbitrary, 
fanciful or clearly unreasonable." U.S. v. McWilliams, 163 
F.2d 695, 697. In a domestic matter involving the issue of 
child support, the Court of Appeals of Arizona made reference 
to another case in which the Supreme Court of Arizona stated 
that "for an abuse of discretion to exist, the record must be 
devoid of competent evidence to support the decision." Platt v. 
Platt, 17 Ariz. App. 458, 498 P.2d 532 (1972). And, finally, 
the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that "abuse of discre-
tion" for purposes of appellate review requires that the 
result be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic 
that it evidences not exercise of will, but perversity of 
will; not exercise of judgment, but defiance thereof; not 
exercise of reason, but rather passion and bias. Wendel v. 
Swanbera, 384 Mich. 468, 185 N.W.2d 348, 351. 
By no flight of the imagination can it be reasonably 
said that the actions of the trial court in this case were arbi-
trary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable. On the basis of this 
record, one could not seriously contend that the decision of the 
trial court is so palpably and grossly viclative of fact and 
logic that it evidences a perversity of will, defiance of judg-
rent and bias, nor can it be shown that the record is devoid of 
:orpetent evidence in support of the court's decision. 
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It should also be mentioned again in this reqard 
that difference in judicial opinion is not tantamount to 
"abuse of judicial discretion". Hamilton v. U.S., 31 A.2d 887, 
889. 
Appella~t asserts that this court "often substitutes 
its judgment for that of the trial court in alimony and properey 
distribution matters" (Brief of Appellant, 11). He follows 
with a "partial listing" of authorities in support of that 
proposition (Ibid.), makes passing reference to "circumstances" 
of those cases which warranted a modification of the trial 
court's judgement, and concludes "in the present case, those 
same circumstances exist and the trial court's decree should 
be modified" (Id. 12). To assert that the circumstances of 
fact presented by this appeal are the "same" as those existing 
in cases referred to by .Z\ppellant is an unhelpful and somewhat 
inaccurate generalization. The combination of facts existina 
in each case of this nature is unique and sufficiently dissimil~ 
frcm others as to defy the utility of any generalizations or 
fixed formulas. By way of illustration brief reference is here 
made to cases cited by Appellant in his Brief on Pages 11 and 1: 
in support of his proposition just stated. 
Appellant first cites Dubois v. Dubois, ~9 Ct.2d 75, 
504 P.2d 1380 (1973) and reports that this court dislllowed 
alimony awarded by the trial cc·-.:rt. ":hile t~at is tr·~e, .'·.ppe::. 
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fails to mention that the basis of this court's holding was that 
the wife was awarded approximately 60 per cent of the marital 
estate valuing $588,581.00 (almost double that of the estate 
presently before the court) along with attorney's fees in the 
sum of $10,000.00. Among the property awarded to the wife v1ere 
assets of an income-producing nature which the court concluded 
would provide her with sufficient income " .to maintain her 
in the manner to which she is accustomed without periodic payments 
from the Defendant." In the present case, however, Respondent 
was awarded no assets of an income-producing nature, and even 
with the decree as it now stands Respondent will not be able 
to maintain herself "in the manner to which she is accustomed." 
It should be noted in this regard that the three lots in 
~orth Ca!olina which were part of the court's award to her 
are unimproved, non-income-producing properties. 
In the next case, ~1artinett v, 11artinett, 8 Ut. 2d 
202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958), Appellant accurately reports that this 
court modified the property distribution made thereon. Here, 
again, however, the facts are substantially dissimilar to those 
now before the court. The marital estate then in question was 
comparatively small and consisted of a farm, two houses and 
some personal property. Virtually all of the estate vas awarded 
to the wife except the husband was given a one-half interest 
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in the smaller of the two homes. Furt!-lermore, unlike the •,,•ife 
who was healthy and working, and 15 years his junior, he was 
of poor health, unable to work and 67 years old. He testified 
"11y heart, wind, and legs are gone. I am waiting to die." 
This court properly concluded that under the circumstances 
he should have been awarded one of the two homes in which he 
could reside. 
In Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P. 2d 525 (Ut. 1976), this 
court reviewed the trial court's denial to decrease alimony 
because of change in circumstances. Although this court 
did take action to reduce the alimony award from $300.00 a 
month to Sl.OO, the stated reasons for so holding were that 
the wife had made no claim that alimony was necessary for her 
support, and that at that particular time, eight years after 
the divorce, she had received both B.A. and '1.A. dearees and 
\vas working. It should also be mentioned parenthetically 
that the original award of alimony which stood for ~any 
years in the sum of $300.00 a month was 23 per cent of her 
husband's income at the time of the divorce ($1,300.00 a 
month). In the present case, Respondent is in definite need 
of the alimony support as ordered which constitutes less than 
11 per cent of Appellant's current salary. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 2 3 -
In Hampton v. Hampton, 80 Ut. 570, 47 P.2d 419 
(1935), appellant filed a petition for the reduction of 
alimony paid to his former wife. The trial court ordered a 
reduction in alimony and the appellant appealed on the grounds 
that it had not been reduced enough. This court took action 
to further reduce the alimony from $54.00 per month to S45.00. 
It is interesting to note, however, that at the time of the 
original divorce, the appellant therein earned $2,100.00 
annually, and the court ordered him to pay $60.00 a month 
alimony to his former wife, which amounted to over 34 per 
cent of his monthly income. The appellant paid alimony 
as ordered for some five years at which time his annual 
salary had decreased to $1,500.00, and yet, even with this 
court's reduction, alimony of $45.00 a month still constituted 
36 per cent of his income. Appellant in the case presently 
before the court dwells on the amount of alimony awarded to 
Respondent but fails to place that in the proper context of 
relating it to his income (less than 11 per cent). 
Although this court made a modification in the 
alimony in 'vilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), 
recognition was given to the fact that the wife was awarded 
substantially all of the property possessed by the parties 
to the marriage, including two homes, stock and bank accounts. 
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This court stated that although alimony in the sum of $50.00 
per month was insufficient for Respondent's support, the assets 
awarded to her, if well managed, would produce supplemental 
income. Again, in the present case, Respondent 1vas not awarded 
assets of an income-producing nature. 
Appellant does not assign any specific error, 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law to the trial 
judge except to say that he thinks the court simply made 
the wrong decision in not awarding to him a bigger slice 
of the pie. In light of the fact that the dissolution of 
this marriage was borne of his desire to leave Respondent 
for another woman, Justice Crockett's comments in Hilson, supra, 
seem to fit the circumstances of this case as well: 
From the decree awarding the plaintiff 
the divorce, the defendant appeals. He 
does not attack the part of the decree 
granting the divorce; on the contrary, 
it seems to suit his designs very well. 
He asked plaintiff to secure a divorce 
for the reason that he was involved with 
a certain r1rs. H. and 1vanted to marry 
her. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
divorce was indispensable to his plans, 
he seems to have desired, not unnaturally, 
to be released from the bonds of matri-
mony at the least possible economic 
disadvantage to himself. 
The court requested counsel for both parties in 
this matter to submit supporting memoranda of law on t'"'O differ· 
ent occasions (Defendant's '!er..orandurn R. 81-92; 'lemorandum of 
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Law submitted by Defendant R. 93-98; Plaintiff's Reply Memo-
randum R. 99-109; Plaintiff's c·1emorandum R 110-122). The 
court no doubt perused the four briefs submitted. In short, 
the trial judge did everything that could have possibly been 
done to put himself in the best position to make an informed 
and objective decision in a very difficult kind of case in which, 
by its nature, no one really wins. It is virtually inevitable 
in a case of this nature that one and probably both of the 
parties will be dissatisfied. 
Appellant is asking this court to re-examine the 
tangible evidence that makes up the record and supersede the 
decree of the trial judge who observed the witnesses, weighed 
the conflicting evidence and entered a decree which in his 
judgment and discretion was as fair and equitable as can be 
made under the circumstances of this case. This court should 
not succumb to the temptation of re-doing what has already 
been carefully done without finding that the trial judge's 
actions were plainly arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreason-
able; and that conclusion simply cannot be reasonably derived 
from this case. 
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Point II 
'I'HE TRIAL COURT'S ADJUSTHENT OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND PROPERTY I~TERESTS OF THE PARTIES lvAS 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 
A. APPELLANT'S STATEHE:-IT OF FACTS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE EXTENT, VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF THE HARITAL ESTATE IS PARTIALLY IN ERROR 
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, CREATES THE ILLUSION THAT 
APPELLANT WAS AIVARDED LESS AND RESPONDENT 
~lORE THA;:< WHAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTUALLY 
AWARDED IN ITS DECREE. 
Appellant's description and evaluation of the 
proportionate interest in the marital estate awarded to 
each party by the lower court is incorrect on eight separate 
counts. This inaccuracy tends to create the appearance that 
Appellant was awarded less, and the Respondent more, than 
what the trial court actually ordered. 
First, although the marital estate included three 
automobiles, Appellant's Statement of Facts accounts for 
only two (Brief of Appellant 6-8). The two vehicles recognized 
by .'\ppellant are the automobile awarded to Respondent and 
the :lercedes-Benz which went to .'\ppellant as part of his 
interest in the professional corporation (Brief of Appellant, 
7, fn. 25). A 1976 Toyota Land Cruiser was awarded to Appell~: 
hovle'Jer, in addition to the '1ercedes-Benz (R. 125, 130). 
That vehicle was valued by ;\ppellant to be worth approximately 
$6,500.00 (Green TR. 62 11. 17-29). 
coin collection" valuec by hire: to !.:>e worth S:'.O,OO() •. )O 1:::. S31 
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as reflected by the court's minute entry order (R. 125). 
Appellant omits to include this asset in his schedule of 
assets entitled "Property Awarded Defendant" on pp. 7 and 8 
of his Brief. In all fairness, this oversight is under-
standable, inasmuch as it was inadvertently omitted from 
the Decree of Divorce as to Property ~istribution (R. 129), 
although the court specifically intended that Appellant receive 
it as reflected in the previously referenced minute entry order. 
Notwithstanding this oversight, inasmuch as Appellant does in 
fact have control and possession of said asset, and inas~uch 
as the court intended that he receive it, it should be 
included in that portion of the marital estate awarded to 
him. 
Third, in his description of "Property Awarded 
Plaintiff" on pp. 6 and 7 of his Brief, Appellant inadver-
tently double counted the item "stoneware" valued at 5400.00, 
inasmuch as it was entered separately as "Item E" and was also 
included as "Item F" as well. 
Fourth, as more fully explained hereinafter, 
Respondent contends that Appellant is attempting to unfairly 
minimize the value of his interest in the pension trust 
awarded to him and valued at $100,000.00, by substracting 
therefrom one-half that areount which allegedly would have 
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to be paid in income taxes if he were to, hypothetically, 
cash out his interest today (Brief of .'\ppellant, 9, fn. 38, 17), 
Fifth, Appellant contends that Respondent " .. has 
not brought any significant property into the marriage whereas 
the Defendant brought into the marriage assets of a value 
exceeding $20,000.00" (Brief of Appellant, 14). Appellant 
assumes a rather incongruous posture by contending that he 
contributed assets in excess of $20,000.00 at the outset of 
their marriage without accounting for the concurrent offsetting 
debts and obligations which he brought to the marriage as well. , 
As previously mentioned, during the pendency of this action, 
Appellant drained the marital estate of some $26,000.00 for the 
purpose of liquidating completely one debt of $20,000.00 and 
partially contributing to a continuing obligation in the sum 
of $6,000.00. ~fuen Appellant's pre-marital assets are offset 
by his pre-marital debts and obligations, it is evident that 
he entered this marriage with a negative net worth, whereas 
Respondent contributed assets of value and was at least debt-
free. At the very least, if those obligations are not of~set 
against the value of Appellant's pre-marital assets, they 
should be included in his share of the marital estate as 
awarded by the trial court. 
Sixth, on p. 5 of his Erie£, !,ppe:!.lant iterc'izes 
the bills oaid and support pro~ided ~espondent ~ro~ the tirre 
separation to the time of trial. Appellant then procee~~ •: 
add t:'lat arr,ount to the "a:!.t.:e of '\espo:-.c'e:c.t' s propert·/ '~' :r:' 
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(Brief of Appellant, 9). This maneuver is highly im9roper. 
Such expenditures for support and payment of bills legitimately 
incurred during the course of marriage should not be included 
in the marital estate, especially in light of the fact that 
Appellant failed to provide equal treatment by adding to the 
value of his property award monies expended in his own behalf 
and for his own support during the pendency of this action as 
well. The effect of this maneuver, as well as others herein 
described, is to unfairly inflate and exaggerate the value 
of what Respondent was awarded by the trial court. 
Seventh, Appellant states "Plaintiff contributed 
absolutely nothing of a monetary nature to the accrual of the 
estate of Plaintiff and Defendant" (Brief of Appellant, 4). 
Nhile it is true that over the years Respondent's monetary 
contribution to the marital estate in comparison to that 
made by Appellant is insignificant; to conclude, however, 
that the bread and butter provider of a marriage should 
be awarded the bulk of the estate simply because he Horks 
out of the home for gain while his wife works inside the home 
for free gives no value to the faithful and valuable, albeit 
non-~onetary contribution made by a wife and homemaker and is 
grossly unfair. Such a narrow-minded view has undoubtedly 
played a role in giving birth to the current movement among 
~o~en to lea~e the home and find recoanition elsewhere. 
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Respondent was not gainfully employed during the 
course of the marriage primarily because their financial cir-
cumstances did not require it and, whatever conversation these 
parties may have had with respect to her becoming engaged in 
a gainful avocation was only born of the concern to provide 
her with some diversion from her wifely chores and variety 
in life. She should not now be punished for electing to 
pursue the life of a housewife and for doing the very things 
she undertook to do when she took the marriage vows to be 
a wife. 
In lVoolley v. lVoolley, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
gave clear recognition of a woman's contribution to a marriage 
in her capacity as a homemaker by awarding her an interest in 
the potential future income of her husband. 
If the money invested in the mining 
ventures has been earned by the efforts 
of defendant in his profession, the 
efforts of the wife and mother in 
taking care of the home and children 
have assisted defendant in his accumu-
lation. Accordingly, she should not 
be denied her share of any increase 
in value that may result in the future. 
Similarly, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held 
that a wife engaged only in domestic activities is, neverthe-
less, entitled to a division of the ffiarital property in a 
divorce proceeding. 
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The efforts of the respective parties 
in accumulating wealth is one of many 
factors that are relevant in the division 
of the marital partners' property [Cita-
tion] and sizable property awards to a 
wife have been approved without mention 
of whether the wife directly added to 
the accumulation of wealth. [Citations.] 
It is well established that a wife's 
housekeeping labors are a factor to be 
considered in dividing property .... 
These services are necessary to the 
maintenance of a civilized lifestyle. 
Reicrer v. Christensen, 529 P.2d 1362 
(C.A.Colo. 1974). 
In Marzique v. Marzique, 356 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir., 
1966), the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia stated: 
Where jointly held property is 
involved, and the evidence shows that 
the husband contributed the bulk, 
if not all, of the funds for the 
purchase thereof, the wife's interest 
is deemed to be conditioned on her 
faithful performance of the marriage 
vows. [Dictum.] 
Eighth, it is the prerogative of the trial judge 
to judge the credibility of witnesses and evidence, and, 
in the case of conflict, the Supreme Court must assume that 
the trial court believed the evidence which best supports 
its findings; consequently, this court should view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings. Stucki v. Stucki, 562 P.2d 240 (Ut. 1977); Carter v. 
Carter, ~; Stone v. Stone, ~· As indicated at the 
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appropriate places in this brief, values assigned to certain 
assets in the marital estate differ as between these parties. 
Respondent submits that the values used by Appellant are not 
exclusively those which best support the court's findin('!s, '"hil! 
those used in this brief are most in keeping with the rule of 
review just stated. 
In each case of this nature, consideration must be 
given to numerous factors. In no case do all factors favor 
one party at the complete exclusion of the other. Nor does 
the degree of importance or emphasis required by each factor 
remain constant from one case to another. Of the myriad of 
factors that could potentially come into play in allocati~g 
1
1 
the financial and property interests of the parties to a a~vorce 
action, Respondent submits that those enumerated immediately 
Fault: It has long been recognized by this court 
that although no firm rule can be uniformly applied in all 
divorce cases, a court may, and invariably does, consider the 
relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their ~2rriace 
vows and th8ir relative guilt or innocence in causina t~e 
break-up of the marriage in formulating the divorce decree a~c 
property distribution. Searle v .. c:earle, 522 P.2d :097 (1974): 
Dubois v. Dubois, supra; \Vilson v. 'Vilson, supra; ··1A.cC'onald '·'· 
~1acDonald, 120 Ut. 573, 236 P. 2d 1066 (l9Sl); Pinior. ··. Pir.ioc.. 
92 Ut. 255, 57 P.2d 265 (1936) .. >.c:-:1itteC:ly this is -o': '::Oe 
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only factor that should be given consideration in this case, 
and Respondent does not seek to have Appellant unfairly penalized; 
but, by the same token, she should not have to suffer or be punished 
for Appellant's actions in breaking up the marriage. The record 
clearly reflects that Appellant would not consider reconciliation 
and simply wanted out of their marriage in order to marry another 
~lOman. .l\.nd yet, Appellant now asks this court to substantially 
reduce his obligation of partial support to Respondent and give 
him a further portion of the estate awarded to her by overruling 
the order of the trial judge who gave judicious consideration 
to all factors here involved. 
Current and Potential Income: It is also well-
established that the court should consider, in addition to the 
relative guilt or innocence of the parties, their present and 
potential incomes. ''lilson v. lvilson, ~· Appellant is 
fortunate to have a lucrative and promising career which has 
developed over the course of this ~arriage. Over that period 
o~ time, Appellant's income has multiplied 400 per cent and 
has every indication of continuing to increase in the future. 
Social Position and Standard of ~ivina: Another 
relevant ~actor is the social position and standard of livina 
enjoyed by the parties during the course o: thei~ ~arriage, 
:;ilson •:. \•lilson, suora. In the '·1acDonald case, supra, this 
court statec: 
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.. that where there are sufficient assets 
and income to do so, she (the wife against 
whom the divorce was granted on ground of 
habitual intoxication) is entitled to be 
provided for according to her station in 
life and as demanded by her condition of 
health and lack of abil~ty to work. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The station in life and (high) standard of living to 
which the partner became accustomed during their marriage is 
evident from the record. Their affluence provided them finan-
cial freedom and security for both the present and the future. 
But, even as the order of the trial court now stands, it can-
not be fairly said that Respondent will be as fortunate as 
Appellant in maintaining the same standard of living and com-
forts heretofore enjoyed by them. 
!Ioney or Property Each Brouoht into the ~1arriaoe: 
c1acDonald v. ;!acDonald, supra; Brief of Appellant, 13. Notwith· 
standing Appellant's self-serving assertion that \vhereas he 
contributed property valuing in excess of $20,000.00, Respon-
dent contributed nothing, the truth of the matter is that 
his debts exceeded his assets at the time and he entered the 
marriage with a negative net worth as heretofore explained. 
The Contribution of Each in the Accumulation of 
the ~!arital Estate: Ibid. The assets of this marital estate 
were accumulated almost exclusively during the course of this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 3 5 -
marriage. Its wealth was developed as a direct result of the 
joint efforts of both parties, i.e., Respondent attending to 
the normal chores and duties which fall to the housewife and 
Appellant in pursuing his career. 
As previously stated, Respondent simply elected to 
give full time and attention to fully supporting Appellant 
by attending to her wifely chores and duties instead of 
pursuing a gainful avocation which he supposedly encouraged 
her to do in order to provide her with some diversification 
of interests and activities. 
Any Extraordinary Sacrifice, Devotion or Care Which 
~ay Have Been Given to the Spouse or Others, Such as t1other, 
Father, Etc.: Ibid. As previously mentioned, during the course 
of their marriage, Respondent assisted in caring for Appellant's 
two sons for a period of one month each year of their marriage. 
During five years Dr. Wilson's father stayed with them for 
a?proximately one month on each occasion; his brother and 
mother were also accustomed to staying with them. In each 
instance, Respondent assisted in making them feel welcome and 
comfortable. In addition to this, the parties enjoyed an 
extensive social life during the marriage. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that with respect 
to the property division, Appellant received even more than 
,,:hat he recommended as a fair and equitable distribution. 
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In his 11emorandum of Law (R. 93), he recommended that the 
marital estate be divided on a two-thirds/one-third basis 
as between himself and Respondent respectively. As 
referenced in the Statement of Facts herein, Appellant received, 
in fact, in excess of two-thirds of the marital estate. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S AHARD OF $2,000 CASH 
HAS BASED ON EVIDENCE ~OT AVAILABLE AT 
THE TIME OF TRIAL HHICH NAS PROI1PTLY 
AND PROPERLY SUBI1ITTED TO THE COURT UPON 
ITS DISCOVERY AND PRIOR TO THE COURT'S 
!1AKING ITS FINAL ORDER. 
This issue arises out of 1976 Federal and state inco~e 
tax refunds amounting to $11,399.00. The relevant income tax 
returns (R. 121, 122) were not available to Respondent at the 
time of trial, but upon their preparation by Appellant were 
promptly submitted to the trial court by Respondent in conjun-
ction 1~ith Plaintiff's :!emorandum (R. 110). Copies of the sa!:'e 
were provided Appellant, giving him ample opportunity to enter~ 
ex-parte objection to this post-trial evidence. No such objec-
tion was made by Appellant. He again assumes an inconsiste~t 
and unfair position by objecting to the S2,000.00 award made 
to :·!rs. 1-lilson in this regard 1vi thout referrinq to the fact 
that he received the balance of the refund amount of $9,?99.00. 
Appellant casts himself in the role of a hypocrit in another 
respect inasmuch as he also submitted post-trial evidence to 
the court which he now asks this court to consider en appea!. 
After the trial, Appellant sub~itted to the ~curt, in co~~~nc-
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tion with his Defendant's :lemorandum (R. 81-92), evidence which 
purported to show (1) that he in fact paid approximately 
$15,000.00 down on a home instead of $10,000.00 (R.9l), and 
(2) that the resale value of his membership interest in the 
Cottonwood Club had a net resale value of approximately 
$1,000.00 exlclusive of a $400.00 transfer fee as opposed 
to a different value given at trial. By submitting this 
evidence, Appellant requested the court to extend to him the 
very consideration which he now asserts was error for the 
court to extend to Respondent. Appellant, in fact, has used 
the values suggested by this post-trial evidence in his 
Statement of Facts on appeal. 
C. APPELLANT'S PENSION-TRUST FUND WAS 
PROPERLY VALUED, AND IH A..l':JY EVEclT HIS ASSIGN-
~ENT OF ERROR IN THIS REGARD IS IMPROPERLY 
RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Appellant's argument that his interest in the tr~st 
fund should be valued at $50,000.00 rather than 5100,000.00 
because he allegedly would have to pay $50,000.00 in income 
taxes if he were to terminate the tr~st today, is devoid of 
merit, and is without any fo~ndation in the evidence. Appellant 
did not offer any evidence at trial either as to the potential 
income tax consequences of cashing out of the trust or as to his 
intention of terminating the trust. Its value was established 
by Appellant's own attorney retained for the purpose of ~anaain9 
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it (Red TR. 29, 11. 13-24; 31, 11. 11-14). Appellant offered 
no evidence to contradict that which established the value of 
$100,000.00. 
Appellant is asking this court to take into consider-
ation a hypothetical situation (i.e., the consequences of his 
terminating the trust at the present time). Appellant has not 
offered any evidence to show that he intends to cash out of 
this trust nor has he offered any legal authority in support 
of his argument in this regard. It is improper for him to 
now request this court to take into consideration the possible 
consequences of an action that he obviously has no intention 
of taking. The facts are that the trust was established to 
provide for retirement or disability and for that purpose its 
value to Appellant is $100,000.00. 
Point III 
RESPONDENT'S A\~ARD OF ALH10NY IS NOT 
ABSOLUTELY PEP11ANENT AND, Itl COHPARISON 
TO DEFENDANT'S INCOI1E AND EARNING POTE~l­
TIAL, IT IS EXTREJ.1ELY HODEST. 
With respect to the award of alimony, Appellant claim 
that the trial court ordered him to pay too much for too long. 
As to the first half of this contention, he refers to the arro~: 
of alimony awarded in the abstract without placing it in the 
proper context in relation to his earnings from his medical 
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practice, nor does he fairly take into consideration the 
standard of living enjoyed by each of these parties during 
the course of their marriage. Although Appellant's ability 
to maintain that same standard of living is virtually unimpaired, 
Respondent faces considerably greater difficulties in this 
regard. 
Appellant refers to the fact that during the course 
of this litigation Respondent submitted a list of her monthly 
expenses on two different occasions. The first itemization 
showed monthly expenses in the sum of $598.00 (Red TR. 68; D. 
8x. #29). The second itemization of monthly expenses was submitted 
at the time of trial and showed a total of $842.00 (P. Ex. #16). 
Appellant, of course, notes the discrepancy and suggests to 
this court that the more modest figure is what Respondent, in 
fact, requires for her support. He fails to account for Respondent's 
testimony at trial, however, wherein she explained that the 
discrepancy arose simply because she miscalculated and under-
estimated her monthly expenses on the first occasion, thus the 
need for the second itemization submitted at trial. Respondent 
testified, for example, as follows: 
Q. Now, you made an estimate earlier, did 
you not, about $600.00 at the time we 
had a preliminary hearing? 
A. Yes, sir. But that was much under-
estimated. It cost r:lore than I thought. 
(Red 'I'R. 68, 11. 5-8.) 
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Had Respondent accurately assessed her monthly 
expenses on the first occasion, that particular itemization 
would have been used at trial and there would have been no 
need to prepare and submit a second one. 
Those factors and considerations previously mentioned 
with respect to the distribution of property are relevant to 
the award of alimony as well; thus, there is no need to re-
travel that territory here, It should be mentioned, 
however, that this Respondent has found no case either in 
Appellant's Brief or from research that supports Appellant's 
contention that the needs of the spouse and the duration of the 
marriage are the two factors of "paramount importance" (Brief 
of Appellant, 19) with respect to the a\·lard of alimony. In 
reality the two factors of "paramount importance" that the 
trial court should, and in this case did, take into consider-
ation with respect to determining the amount and duration of 
alimony are (1) the necessities of the wife, and (2) ~he 
fina~cial ability of the husband. 
Broadly speaking, the ori~cioal factors 
or circumstances which govern the amount 
to be allowed as permanent alimony are 
the necessities of the wife and the-rlnan-
cial ability of the husband to meet them. 
Other factors have been mentioned, most of 
which are merely aspects of these two 
qeneral tests. Thus, it has been said 
that the court should consider the finan-
cial conditio~ of the par~ies, the capacity 
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of the husband to earn, the capacity of 
the wife to earn, the age, health and 
general physical condition of the parties, 
their social standing, and their conduct 
or misconduct, especially with reference 
to the question of fault in causing the 
termination of the marriage. 24 Am.Jur.2d 
Divorce §631, p. 750 (Emphasis added). 
In the case of Hampton v. Hampton, supra, this 
court stated, "The amount of alimony is !'1easured by the wife's 
needs and requirements, considering her station in life, and 
upon the husband's ability to pay." (Emphasis added.) 
It is important to place Respondent's "necessities" 
in the context of the standard of living and kind of lifestyle 
to which these parties became accustomed during the course of 
their marriage. In the abstract, "necessity" is a very 
amorphous concept which provides little assistance unless 
these other factors are taken into consideration. One indivi-
dual's bare necessity is another's luxury; and in this case 
as well as any other alimony should be awarded in an amount 
sufficient to enable Respondent to maintain her social stand-
i~c or station in life. 
The amount of alimony awarded should be 
so apportioned as to secure to the wife 
the same social standing, comforts and 
luxuries of life as she would probably 
have enjoyed had it not been for the 
enforced separation, but care should be 
taken that it does not amount to an 
appropriation of the entire estate of 
the l1usband. Id., 5635, pp. 755, 756. 
Proba~lv the ~ost i~oortar.t elel'1ent that 
enters into the ~eterminatlon of the amo~n~ 
o~ ~he Jllowance of aliro~y is the financial 
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condition of the parties, includinq the 
1ncome or earn1nq power of the husband and 
that of the w1fe. The court must take 
into account the resources of the wife, 
including the property awarded to her in 
the divorce proceeding. Aside from the 
wife's separate means or estate, the 
size and productiveness of that of the 
husband are important factors in deter-
mining the amount of the allowance, although 
they are not to be considered without refer-
ence to whether or not the wife was of 
assistance to him in accumulating the 
property. Id., §631, pp. 751, 752 (Emphasis added.) 
Next to the property or resources of 
which he is already possessed, consider-
ation should be given to the husband's 
earning capacit~, future prospects and 
probable acquis1tion of wealth from anv 
source whatever. Id., §632, p. 753 (Emphasis 
added. 
The second half of Appellant's argument on appeal 
with respect to the issue of alimony goes to its indefinite 
duration. It should be noted in this regard that inasmuch as 
all matters of this nature are made subject to the continuino 
jurisdiction of the court, they are not cast in concrete, but, 
rather, are subject to modification upon showing the proper 
change in circumstances. The trial court obviously took ~his 
fact into consideration in making its award of alimony as 
reflected in the following statement made by the trial judge 
in response to an objection entered against Dr. Wilson who was: 
testify as to what hethought an x-ray technician might earn: 
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THE COURT: Objection sustained. wnat do 
you claim for it? 
MR. SU11MERHAYS: I claim she can qualify 
without any difficulty to become an 
x-ray technician, that she can earn 
$750.00 a month without any difficulty. 
THE COURT: Well, as soon as she starts 
earning $750.00 a month, then I suppose 
we would have a change of circumstances. 
As of now, under her testimony, and 
I don't suppose it is contradicted, it 
has been 20 years since she was an x-ray 
technician. She would have to take a 
complete re-training. I think I can 
take her testimony in that regard in making 
a decision, but what an x-ray technician 
makes today seems to be immaterial and the 
objection is sustained. (Green TR. 31, 
11. 23-30; 32, 11. 1-6.) 
Inasmuch as it is not possible to foresee or 
anticipate all of the developments and changes that the future 
holds for these parties, the alimony award made by the trial 
court has greater potential of dealing fairly and equitably 
with them than would an award imposing an arbitrary date of 
termination, which would blindly cut off support without 
consideration to the relevant needs and circumstances. Under 
the decree as it now stands, Appellant can petition the court 
to terminate alimony when the circumstances so warrant; it is 
obvious, however, that the trial court was of the opinion 
that Respondent should be awarded alimony in the sum ordered 
under her present circumstances. 
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Appellant, understandably places emphasis on the 
duration of the marriage of these parties, and while it is 
recognized that it did not last half a century, it should be 
noted that its termination is a direct result of the attitudes 
and conduct of Appellant in desiring to scrap this marriage 
for another. Furthermore, Respondent submits that consideratio~ 
should not only be given to the duration of the marriage 
(which incidentally was far longer than any of those involved 
in Appellant's cited cases in this regard), but consideration 
should also be given to the time of life that this marriage 
consumed. At the time of its beginning Respondent was at 
a station in life when the prospects for remarriage were 
substantially greater at age 33 than they are now at age 42. 
It takes little reflection to realize that the prospect of 
finding a long and lasting relationship with another is :ar 
greater for a man in middle age that it is for a woman, and, 
unlike Appellant, ~espondent had no prospect waiti~g in the 
wings during the pendency of this action. 
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?..ESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF ON APPEAL 
THE JUDGHENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE 
AFFIR!1ED AND RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AI'TARDED 
A REASONABLE ATTOR:-JEY' S FEE INCURRED n1 
DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, 
and Respondent submits that there is nothing in the record 
below to indicate that the trial judge abused his discretion 
in entering the Decree of Divorce in any respect, and that 
by virtue of this appeal, she has been put to the unnecessary 
expense of having to engage the further services of legal 
counsel. Consequently, she respectfully requests this court 
to award her a reasonable attorney's fee for defending this 
appeal. Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Ut. 1977); 
Kiger v. Kiger, 29 Ut.2d 167, SOG P.2d 441 (1973). 
CONCLUSION 
This court has sr.ated: 
\ve believe the great weight of authority 
supports the rule that a decree of the 
trial court in divorce proceedings, 
relative to alimony and division of pro-
perty, will not be modified except when 
the trial court has abused its discretion. 
Otherwise, the appellate court by its 
own actions would alter the purpose for 
which it 11as created. An appellate court 
cannot remain a court of appeals and 
invite review of every case decided by 
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a lower tribunal where its judgment fails 
to satisfy one or both parties to the liti-
gation. Woolley v. Woolley, suora. 
And, it might be added, in a divorce action, more 
than any other kind of litigation, the probabilities are great 
that one, and often both, parties will be dissatisfied. ~o 
one really wins, and an unpleasant task is simply accomplished 
as best as can be done under the circumstances. It is, never-
theless, difficult, if not impossible to divide the marital 
estate in such a manner as to award each party just ~hat each 
thinks he desires or wants, and thus, the need for according 
the trial judge a wide latitude of discretion in these matters. 
As one considers the facts of this case, one cannot 
reasonably conclude that the Appellant has been treated unfairly 
and that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion. 
lfuereas Jl_ppellant entered this marriage •.vith a negative net 
worth, Respondent came to it debt-free and contributed assets 
of practical use and value. l'lhereas Appellant retains his 
annual income in excess of $100,000.00, exclusive of alimony 
and income from other sources, Respondent has monthly ali~ony 
in the sum of $900.00 which is less than ll per cent of 
Appellant's income. 
\'lhereas Appellant was awarded in excess of n1o-thirds 
of the marital estate, which was accumulated during the course 
of the marriage, Respondent was awarded less than one-~hird. 
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lffiereas Appellant was awarded properties of an income-
producing nature, Respondent has no assets which could poten-
tially provide a supplemental income. 
lffiereas Appellant is a highly trained and skilled 
individual, Respondent is not presently trained or skilled for 
any particular employment and 20 years have elapsed since 
she was involved in her area of expertise. lffiereas during 
the course of this marriage Appellant's earning capacity 
increased 400 per cent, Respondent's earning ability sub-
stantially suffered as she attended to her husband's needs 
so as to enable him to develop his practice and increase 
his earning potential. 
Nhereas Appellant retains the certainty of a 
promising medical career, Respondent faces a doubtful future. 
Whereas Appellant retains not only the present security but 
security for the future in the form of the pension trust 
fund which was created and contributed to during the course 
of this marriage, Respondent faces an uncertain future wi~hout 
any such security. \ffiereas Appellant has the certainty of 
new companionship, Respondent faces an uncertain future in 
this regard as well. 
lffiereas .~.ppellant 1-1ill no doubt be able to maintain 
t:Ce same standard of living to 1-1hich both parties became 
accusto~ed during the course of this marriage, the prospects 
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for the Respondent in this regard are not so promising, and, 
in fact, Appellant now asks this court to further adjust her 
position downward. 
While Respondent is grateful for the consideration 
extended to her children by Appellant, she also notes the 
care and devotion which she extended to his family as well, 
in addition to fulfilling her responsibilities of a housewife. 
The Appellant simply has not sustained his burden 
on appeal by showing that the trial court's actions were 
arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable, or that its 
findings are devoid of competent evidence or violative of 
fact and logic. 
\\Therefore, Respondent respectfully prays this 
court to affirm the decree entered below and award her a 
reasonable attorney's fee incurred in defending this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JENSEN & LEW,IS, P. C. 
/ '/. / 
1// 
I L.-1/ / 
:,..,.;.y ~1., LE~I/IS 
Atborneys for R~spondent 
Delivered two copies of the foreaoing Brief to 
L. L. S:..1nrne::-hays, At.tor::.ey ~or .;..ppell.ar:t, :.::is ~ lst r:a.y o: 
Fe!Jru:>.ry, 1) 7 8. 
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